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I. Introduction
The Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act (FSIA) established a compre-
hensive and exclusive legal regime for the adjudication in United States
courts of claims against foreign states and government agencies. ' The act
transferred responsibility for determinations of sovereign immunity from
the State Department to the courts, and it codified the restrictive theory
of immunity which permits governments to be sued in foreign courts for
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of the Ad Hoc Committee on Revision of the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act of the
Section of International Law and Practice of the American Bar Association. The Committee
developed the amendments to the FSIA proposed in H.R. 3137 and H.R. 4592 to improve
the judicial remedies available to Americans with claims against foreign governments. The
ABA House of Delegates adopted a resolution supporting these amendments in August,
1984.
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Governmental Relations, Committee on the Judiciary, U.S. House of Representatives, in
support of the enactment ofH.R. 3137 and H.R. 4592, on May 20, 1986. The author appeared
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actment of the amendments. See Arbitral Awards: Hearing on H.R. 3106, H.R. 4342, H.R.
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Comm. on the Judiciary, 99th Cong., 2d Sess. 81 (1986) (statement of Mark B. Feldman).
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commercial activities and some other acts that affect the interests of the
forum.
This regime has worked reasonably well over the past ten years, but
there have been difficulties and uncertainties. The American Bar Asso-
ciation (ABA) supports the amendments proposed in H.R. 3137. These
amendments address some of the most serious problems in the present
law. They would not change the principles of the FSIA. They would
improve the operation of the law and give effect to the intent of Congress
by clarifying certain ambiguities and by filling certain gaps in the statutory
scheme.
H.R. 3137 includes five separate amendments relating to (1) the defi-
nition of commercial activity, (2) the enforcement of foreign arbitral awards,
(3) the act of state doctrine, (4) execution of judgment against the com-
mercial assets of foreign states, and (5) prejudgment attachment of prop-
erty belonging to foreign government agencies engaging in commercial
activity in the United States. Each will be discussed in the following.
Although the ABA also endorses the amendments to the admiralty pro-
visions contained in H.R. 4592, this comment will not detail its views on
that bill.
II. The Five Amendments in H.R. 3137
A. COMMERCIAL ACTIVITY
The first section of H.R. 3137 would clarify the definition of commercial
activity in section 1603 of the act to make explicit the intent of Congress,
which is clearly stated in the legislative history of the FSIA, that a foreign
state is engaged in commercial activity when it borrows money or guar-
antees repayment of a loan made to another party.2 Consequently, the
foreign state can be sued on its promise to pay or on its guarantee in a
court in the United States, if the other jurisdictional requirements of the
FSIA are present. Sovereign immunity does not apply to transactions in
financial markets.
This is a technical amendment that does not change the thrust of the
act. As stated in the legislative history, the FSIA treats all contracts for
the sale of goods or services, including loans, as commercial activities
regardless of the purpose of the transaction or the governmental functions
involved. 3 The sole exception contemplated by the framers of the FSIA
2. H.R. REP. No. 1487, 94th Cong., 2d Sess., reprinted in 1976 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD.
NEws 6604, 6615.
3. Id. The few cases to the contrary are wrongly decided. See MOL, Inc. v. The People's
Republic of Bangladesh, 736 F.2d 1326 (9th Cir. 1984); Practical Concepts, Inc. v. Republic
of Bolivia, 615 F. Supp. 92 (D.D.C. 1985).
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is a contract of employment between a government and its own national
for service as a government official. 4
The ABA recommends this particular amendment, because the U.K.
State Immunity Act of 1978 expressly states that loans and loan guarantees
are commercial transactions. 5 The banking bar believes the amendment
would help avoid adverse comparisons being made between U.S. and
U.K. financial markets as regards the security of loans made to foreign
sovereigns.
B. ENFORCEMENT OF FOREIGN ARBITRAL AWARDS
Section 2 of H.R. 3137 would add a new paragraph (6) to section 1605(a)
of the act to clarify the jurisdiction of the federal courts to enforce ar-
bitration agreements with and arbitral awards made against foreign states
and government agencies. This amendment is needed because the statute
enacted in 1976 makes no specific reference to arbitration, and some of
the courts are having difficulty discerning the intent of Congress on this
important subject. The State Immunity Acts of the United Kingdom and
Australia provide for the enforcement of arbitral awards, and the ABA
believes the FSIA should also. 6
The legislative history of the FSIA indicates that Congress expected
arbitration awards to be executed against the commercial assets of foreign
states under sections 1605(a)(1) and 1610(a)(1) of the act. These provisions
authorize the court to act where the foreign state has waived its immunity
from jurisdiction or from execution "either explicitly or by implication,
notwithstanding any withdrawal of the waiver the foreign state may pur-
port to effect except in accordance with the terms of the waiver." Under
the FSIA, the waiver of immunity constitutes consent to the jurisdiction
of the court. The Report of the Judiciary Committee notes that courts
have found implicit waivers of immunity "in cases where a foreign state
has agreed to arbitration in another country or where the state has agreed
that the law of another country governs its agreement. ' 7
The courts have had no difficulty finding an implicit waiver of immunity
where the agreement provides for arbitration in the United States, 8 but
some judges have been uncertain whether the same rule applies where
4. See H.R. REP., supra note 2, at 6615; Broadbent v. Organization of American States,
628 F.2d 27 (D.C. Cir. 1980); Tuck v. Pan American Health Organization, 668 F.2d 547 (D.C.
Cir. 1981).
5. State Immunity Act of 1978, Chap. 33, sec. 3(3)(b).
6. Id. at sees. 9 & 17.
7. H.R. REP., supra note 2 at 6617 & 6627.
8. Birch Shipping Corp. v. Embassy of the United Republic of Tanzania, 507 F. Supp.
311 (D.D.C. 1980).
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the agreement provides for arbitration in a third country. In the case most
directly in point, Ipitrade International, S.A. v. Federal Republic of Ni-
geria,9 the court enforced an arbitral award made in Switzerland against
Nigeria on the basis of a waiver of immunity implied from Nigeria's
agreement that "performance of the contract would be governed by the
laws of Switzerland and that any disputes arising under the contract would
be submitted to arbitration by the International Chamber of Com-
merce ... "
An important element in the court's decision was the fact that the award
fell within the compass of the United Nations Convention on the Rec-
ognition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards (the New York
Convention). The United States, Nigeria, and Switzerland are all parties
to that convention. Under its terms, the United States is bound to enforce
an arbitral award made in the territory of another state party to the con-
vention unless enforcement is excused on limited grounds specified in the
convention. Sovereign immunity is not a defense to enforcement specified
in the convention. 10
The Ipitrade decision respects the treaty obligations of the United States
and gives effect to the intent of Congress in the FSIA. Unfortunately,
there are a number of comments critical of Ipitrade in cases where plain-
tiffs have attempted to persuade the courts that a state's agreement to
arbitrate in a third country waives immunity from the jurisdiction of a
U.S. court to adjudicate, on the merits, a claim for damages for breach
of contract. 1
As a result of these dicta, there is uncertainty whether the United States
courts have jurisdiction to enforce an arbitral award made against a foreign
state in a third country even where the United States has a treaty obli-
gation to enforce such an award. This uncertainty is a serious problem
for American trade and investment, because arbitration has become the
preferred procedure for the peaceful resolution of disputes between pri-
vate parties and foreign states and government agencies. In the vast ma-
jority of cases, American enterprises accept arbitration with foreign states
and government agencies in neutral third countries, and they usually do
so in expectation that the arbitration award will be enforceable in the
9. 465 F. Supp. 824 (D.D.C. 1978).
10. Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards, June 10, 1958, 21 U.S.T.
2518, T.I.A.S. No. 6997, 751 U.N.T.S. 398 at Sec. V.
11. See Ohntrup v. Firearms Center Inc., 516 F. Supp. 1281 (E.D. Pa. 1981); Chicago
Bridge & Iron Co. v. Iran, 506 F. Supp. 981 (N.D. 111. 1980); Verlinden B.V. v. Central Bank
of Nigeria, 488 F. Supp. 1284 (S.D.N.Y. 1980), aff'd on other grounds 647 F.2d 320 (2d Cir.
1981), rev'd and remanded 461 U.S. 480 (1983). See generally, Frolova v. U.S.S.R., 761
F.2d 370, 377 (7th Cir. 1985).
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United States and other countries under the New York Convention or
another applicable treaty.
International commercial arbitration is a hybrid process. It depends on
the agreement of the parties, but it relies on national courts for enforce-
ment of that agreement. In practice, most sovereign parties respect their
obligation to carry out arbitration awards rendered against them, but that
tradition rests on expectations that awards are enforceable in court if they
are not implemented voluntarily.
The confusion in the U.S. courts as to when an agreement to interna-
tional arbitration constitutes a waiver of sovereign immunity raises doubts
as to the enforceability of awards under arbitration agreements in a great
many international contracts and complicates the negotiation of arbitra-
tion clauses in new agreements.
H.R. 3137 would solve these problems by specifying certain circum-
stances where an agreement to arbitrate or an arbitral award is enforceable
in the United States courts. Under this amendment, sovereign immunity
would not be a defense if (1) the arbitration takes place in the United
States, (2) the arbitration is or may be governed by a United States treaty
obligation, or (3) the underlying claim could have been brought against
the foreign state in a United States court under the jurisdictional criteria
prescribed in the FSIA.
To avoid misunderstandings as to the intent of this provision, a few
words of explanation may be helpful. First, this amendment does not
replace sections 1605(a)(1) and 1610(a)(l) of the act. A court may still
hold that a particular agreement to arbitrate constitutes a waiver of im-
munity and consent to the jurisdiction of the court. For instance, the
model arbitration clause recommended by the American Arbitration As-
sociation stipulates that "judgment upon the award rendered may be en-
tered in any Court having jurisdiction thereof." Many international con-
tracts provide that "the award may be enforced by any court of competent
jurisdiction." Language of this type will support a waiver of immunity.
H.R. 3137 addresses the situation where the arbitration agreement is
silent on enforcement. It provides, inter alia, for enforcement of foreign
arbitral awards which are the subject of a treaty or agreement calling for
the enforcement of arbitral awards. In effect, this rule codifies the decision
in the Ipitrade case that agreement to arbitrate constitutes a waiver of
immunity even if the award is rendered abroad. The United States is party
to a number of multilateral and bilateral agreements that fall within this
provision. 12 Perhaps the most important is the New York Convention.
12. E.g., Convention on the Settlement of Investment Disputes Between States and
Nationals of Other States, Mar. 18, 1965, 17 U.S.T. 1270, T.I.A.S. No. 6090, 792 U.N.T.S.
368; the U.S.-Iran Claims Settlement Agreement. Declaration of the Democratic and Popular
Republic of Algeria, Jan. 19, 1981, 75 A.J.I.L. 422.
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Under that convention, the United States is obligated to enforce an
arbitral award made in the territory of another contracting state. Most
arbitration agreements between private parties and foreign states provide
for arbitration in a neutral state that is party to the New York Convention
or they authorize the arbitrators or an arbitration institution to determine
the situs of the arbitration. The amendment is worded to provide for
enforcement of the award if the arbitration takes place in a state party to
the New York Convention or if the arbitrators were authorized to choose
such a situs whether they did so or not. However, if the parties agreed
to hold the arbitration in a state that is not party to the New York Con-
vention, the U.S. courts will not enforce the award unless there is another
basis for jurisdiction.
The ABA believes this result is consistent with the expectations of
parties to arbitration agreements.' 3 Approximately seventy states, in-
cluding all the established centers of arbitration, are party to the New
York Convention. Arbitration institutions invariably locate arbitrations in
states that are party to the New York Convention. A number of states
that are not party to the New York Convention routinely participate in
arbitrations located in countries that belong to the convention. Thus, it
is fair to conclude that any government that agrees to arbitration with a
foreign party in a location to be determined by a third party has every
reason to expect that the proceeding will result in an award which is
enforceable under the New York Convention.
The sovereign party expects to have the benefit of the award if it is
rendered in its favor.'4 Good faith and mutuality require that the other
party has the same advantage. H.R. 3137 will ensure this result and will
help attract capital and technology to developing countries by providing
security for international transactions.
The argument has been made in some cases that a federal district court
is precluded from enforcing an arbitration award made in a foreign state
if the defendant is not present in the jurisdiction and the underlying trans-
action has no connection with the United States.' 5 It is claimed that the
exercise ofjurisdiction in these circumstances would not satisfy the "min-
imum contacts" required by the due process clause of the Fifth and
Fourteenth Amendments of the Constitution. 16
13. See Feldman, Waiver of Foreign Sovereign Immunity by Agreement to Arbitrate:
Legislation Proposed by the American Bar Association 40 ARB. J. 24, (1985).
14. La Socidtd Nationale de Recherche (Sonatrach) v. Shaheen Natural Resources, 585
F. Supp. 57 (S.D.N.Y. 1983), aff'd 733 F.2d 260 (2d Cir. 1984).
15. This contention was not accepted in Libyan American Oil Company v. Socialist
People's Libyan Arab Jamahirya, 482 F.Supp. 1175 (D.D.C. 1980), vacated after settlement,
684 F.2d 1032 (D.C. Cir. 1981).
16. See International Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310 (1945).
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This contention ignores two important considerations. First, constitu-
tional objections to the personal jurisdiction of the court may be waived. 17
Nothing in the Constitution precludes a foreign state from waiving its
immunity and consenting to the jurisdiction of a United States court.
Second, a federal district court may enforce a judgment or an arbitral
award against property within its jurisdiction, even if it would not have
jurisdiction to adjudicate the dispute on the merits.
As noted by the Supreme Court in Shaeffer v. Heitner,18 the minimum
contacts required by the Fourteenth Amendment before a state court may
exercise jurisdiction over a nonresident party in an action for damages
are not required to execute ajudgment made by the court of another state
against property of the defendant in the forum. " ...there would seem
to be no unfairness in allowing an action to realize on that debt in a state
where the defendant has property, whether or not that state would have
had jurisdiction to determine the existence of the debt as an original
matter."' 19 The same logic applies to the execution by a federal court of
foreign judgments and foreign arbitral awards. Any other conclusion would
impede the United States from discharging its obligations under the New
York Convention to enforce foreign arbitral awards.
C. THE ACT OF STATE DOCTRINE
Section 3 of H.R. 3137 would add a new paragraph (b) to section 1606
of the FSIA that would bar application of the act of state doctrine in
expropriation, breach of contract and arbitration cases brought under the
act. This amendment is necessary to give effect to the intent of Congress
in enacting the FSIA, which provides for the adjudication of such claims
in the United States courts in prescribed circumstances. A number of
decisions in the lower courts have applied the act of state doctrine in
circumstances which frustrate the intent of Congress, and the relevant
Supreme Court opinions have failed to provide clear guidance as to the
continuing validity and scope of the doctrine.
This amendment does not attempt to deal with the act of state doctrine
comprehensively. It only addresses certain cases arising under the FSIA.
The amendment does not apply to any claim brought against a private
party, 20 and it does not apply to all claims brought against foreign states
17. See Shaeffer v. Heitner, 433 U.S. 186 (1977); see also World-Wide Volkswagen Corp.
v. Woodson, 444 U.S. 286, at 295, n. 10 (1980).
18. 433 U.S. 186 (1977).
19. Shaeffer v. Heitner, 433 U.S. at 210, n. 36. In Transatlantic Bulk Shipping and Saudi
Chartering, S.A., 622 F.Supp. 25 (S.D.N.Y. 1985) the court declined to confirm a foreign
arbitral award where no property of the defendant was present in the jurisdiction.
20. See Hunt v. Mobil Oil. 550 F.2d 68 (2d Cir. 1977).
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under the FSIA. 2' The ABA takes no position on application of the act
of state doctrine in cases not addressed by the amendment, and it urges
the Congress to clearly state its intent that no inferences should be drawn
from the amendment with respect to cases that fall outside the scope of
the amendment.
The act of state doctrine has several different manifestations in U.S.
case law, and it is one of the most controversial issues in the field of
foreign relations law. The problem addressed in this legislation derives
from the 1964 decision in Banco Nacional de Cuba v. Sabbatino, 376 U.S.
398, where the Supreme Court held that the courts would not examine
the validity under international law of a taking by a recognized foreign
sovereign of property located within its own territory in the absence of
a treaty or other unambiguous agreement regarding controlling legal
principles.
This particular decision was reversed by Act of Congress in the second
Hickenlooper Amendment to the Foreign Assistance Act, 22 and subse-
quent decisions of the Supreme Court have declined to apply the act of
state doctrine in various circumstances. 23 However, the Supreme Court
has not repudiated the act of state doctrine as such, and the lower courts
have construed the Hickenlooper Amendment narrowly. 24 As a result,
the doctrinal basis for the act of state doctrine has become thoroughly
confused. There is no certainty in litigation involving actions by foreign
states, and a number of decisions have reached unjust results in circum-
stances where there was no foreign policy imperative requiring the court
to give effect to the damaging act of the foreign sovereign. 2 5
To cite a few of the most egregious examples:
(I) In 1980, in the Liamco case, a district court refused on act of state
grounds to enforce an arbitration award against Libya relating to its ex-
propriation of American investments in that country. 26 This decision was
clearly erroneous, because the reasons for the act of state doctrine do
not apply where the court is not asked to enter the merits of a controversy.
However, the case was settled before the court of appeals could review
21. See IAM v. OPEC, 649 F.2d 1354 (9th Cir. 1981).
22. 22 U.S.C. 2370 (e) (2) (1964).
23. First National City Bank v. Banco Nacional de Cuba, 406 U.S. 759 (1972); Alfred
Dunhill of London v. Republic of Cuba, 425 U.S. 682 (1976); First National City Bank v.
Banco Para El Commercio de Cuba, 462 U.S. 611 (1983).
24. See, e.g., Banco Nacional de Cuba v. First National City Bank, 431 F.2d 394 (2d
Cir.), vacated and remanded on other grounds, 400 U.S. 1019 (1970), original judgment
adhered to 442 F.2d 530 (2d Cir. 1971), rev'd on other grounds, 406 U.S. 759 (1972).
25. See generally, RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS OF TIF UNITED
STATES (Revised) § 469 (Tent. Draft No. 2, Dec. 5, 1985).
26. Libyan American Oil Co. v. Socialist People's Libyan Arab Jamahirya, 482 F. Supp.
1175 (D.D.C. 1980).
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the matter. Although the opinion of the district court was vacated by the
court of appeals, 27 it was never formally reversed.
(2) In 1981, the Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit applied the act
of state doctrine to bar adjudication of an expropriation counterclaim in
an action brought by a Cuban agency against the owner of property con-
fiscated by Cuba. As in Sabbatino, Cuba was able to use the United States
courts to collect a debt without being required to honor its obligations to
the defendant. 28
(3) In 1984, the Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit stunned the bar
in the Allied Bank case by applying a variation of the act of state doctrine,
which it labeled "comity," to deny an American bank a judicial remedy
to enforce a loan agreement with a defaulting sovereign borrower. 29 The
court reconsidered this decision at the government's request and ulti-
mately decided that the act of state doctrine did not apply to that loan, 30
but the two decisions in the Allied Bank case raise further questions as
to the scope of the act of state doctrine.
Application of the act of state doctrine in suits brought under the FS1A
to enforce the commercial obligations of foreign states frustrates the intent
of Congress in providing a remedy for such obligations in section 1605(a)
(2) of the act. The Report of the Judiciary Committee recommending
adoption of the FSIA clearly endorses the "commercial activities" ex-
ception to the act of state doctrine adopted by the plurality opinion of
the Supreme Court in Dunhill v. Republic of Cuba. 31 A few decisions
have applied the "commercial activities" exception, but most courts ap-
pear to regard this as an open issue. 32
H.R. 3137 deals with these issues by eliminating the act of state doctrine
as a defense in any action brought under the FSIA for breach of contract
or for expropriation in violation of international law. It also ensures that
enforcement of arbitration agreements and awards will not be barred by
the act of state doctrine.
This amendment will ensure claimants the judicial remedy granted by
Congress without burdening the courts unduly. Section 1605 of the act
requires substantial contacts with the United States for jurisdiction re-
lating to commercial transactions and expropriation claims. Enforcement
of arbitral awards does not require the court to consider the merits of the
27. 684 F.2d 1032 (D.C. Cir. 1981).
28. Empresa Cubana Exportadora de Azucas v. Lamborn & Co., Inc., 652 F.2d 231 (198 1).
29. Allied Bank International v. Banco Credito Agricola De Cartago, 723 F.2d 23 (2d Cir.
1984) (Allied Bank 1).
30. 757 F.2d 516 (1985) (Allied Batik 11).
31. 425 U.S. 682 (1976). H.R. REP., supra note 2, at 6619.
32. Compare Texas Trading & Milling Corp. v. Federal Republic of Nigeria, 647 F.2d 300
(2d Cir. 1981) with Callejo v. Bancomer, S.A., 764 F.2d 1101 (5th Cir. 1985).
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dispute and, as a practical matter, requires the presence of property of
the defendant in the United States.
The jurisdiction provided for the adjudication of expropriation claims
under the FSIA is particularly narrow. Those claims can come before the
courts either as counterclaims or under section 1605(a)(3) of the act. That
provision establishes jurisdiction of two classes of cases in which "rights
in property taken in violation of international law are in issue." In the
first class, the property or property exchanged for it is present in the
United States in connection with a commercial activity carried on in the
United States by the foreign state. In the second class, the property or
property exchanged for it is owned or operated by an agency or instru-
mentality of the foreign state, and that agency or instrumentality is en-
gaged in a commercial activity in the United States. 33
By enacting section 1605(a)(3) in these precise terms, the Congress has
made a judgment that the sensitivities of foreign states should not stand
in the way of the administration of justice where there is an uncompen-
sated expropriation and the foreign state seeks the benefits of the United
States market in the manner contemplated by the statute. Application of
the act of state doctrine in those circumstances would frustrate both the
administration of justice and the intent of Congress.
D. EXECUTION OF JUDGMENT
Section 4 of H.R. 3137 would amend section 1610 of the act in order
to liberalize the provisions on execution of judgment against the com-
mercial assets of foreign states and government agencies. This is one of
the most important sections of the bill. Sections 1609-1611 of the FSIA,
which govern execution of judgment, are both unduly restrictive and
poorly drafted.
As the law stands today, there are few opportunities to execute any
judgment against a foreign state unless the foreign state has waived its
immunity from execution of judgment. Execution can be made more readily
against the assets of a separate agency or instrumentality of the foreign
state, but only if the agency liable on the judgment is engaged in com-
mercial activity in the United States. 34
One of the main problems with the FSIA as presently drafted is that
the language of section 1610(a)(2) of the act limits execution of ajudgment
based on the commercial activity of a foreign state to commercial property
33. In the second case, the property need not be present in the United States. Kalamazoo
Spice Extraction Company v. The Provisional Military Government of Socialist Ethiopia,
616 F. Supp. 660 (W.D. Mich. 1985).
34. 28 U.S.C. § 1610(b) (1982).
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which "is or was used for the commercial activity upon which the claim
is based." In most cases, it is doubtful that a foreign state will have
commercial assets in the United States that are or were used for the
commercial activity upon which the claim is based. This possibility is
made even more unlikely by the fact that, as presently drafted, the FSIA
does not permit prejudgment attachment to secure execution of ajudgment
unless the claimant obtains an explicit waiver of immunity from prejudg-
ment attachment. 35
For instance, suppose the Ministry of Public Works of Patria purchases
earth moving equipment from a U.S. manufacturer and fails to pay for
the equipment. The American company could obtain a money judgment
against the foreign state under section 1605(a)(2) of the act, but it is
unlikely that Patria would have commercial assets in the United States
related to that transaction.
Take another case. Suppose the Ministry of Mines of Patria exports
metals to the United States and the American purchaser subsequently
determines that the product delivered is not up to the standard required
by the contract. The American firm could obtain a judgment against the
foreign state under section 1605(a)(2). However, it would be difficult to
execute judgment against Patria unless the claimant could demonstrate
that the proceeds of the export had been retained in the United States.
In the event the company brings a lawsuit against Patria, the foreign state
would have every reason to remove those proceeds from the United States
before judgment. Thus, the foreign state can easily frustrate execution of
judgment, if it wishes to avoid payment or to negotiate a more advanta-
geous settlement.
There are other serious problems under the present law. Section 1610
of the FSIA does not make any specific provision for execution of a
noncommercial tort judgment except where there is an insurance policy
for automobile accidents or other liabilities. 36 Further, the Act is murky
concerning the scope of execution of judgments based on expropriation,
an arbitration award, a counterclaim or a maritime lien. 37 In each case,
the foreign state might argue that the remedy is very restricted or even
nonexistent. The legislative history of these provisions is sparse and,
where it exists, tends to confuse the issue rather than to clarify it.
There are few relevant cases. In Letelier v. The Republic of Chile, the
heirs of the former ambassador murdered in Washington obtained a default
judgment against the Government of Chile under section 1605(a)(5) of the
35. 28 U.S.C. § 1610(d) (1982).
36. 28 U.S.C. § 1610(a)(5) (1982).
37. See 28 U.S.C. § 1610(a)(i)-(3) (1982).
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Act, 38 and they attempted to execute that judgment against the assets of
the state-owned airline. The district court, believing that Congress would
not have established jurisdiction over the foreign state without also pro-
viding an effective remedy, ordered execution against the airline. 39 The
court of appeals reversed on two grounds: the airline was a juridical entity
separate from the state that owned it and its assets were deemed not
available for execution of a judgment against the state, and even if the
district court were correct in disregarding the airline's separate identity
on the particular facts of this case, the commercial property of a foreign
state is immune from execution of a tort judgment under section 1605 (a)
(5) of the act. The Court concluded that "... Congress did in fact create
a right without a remedy." 40
H.R. 3137 would recast section 1610 of the FSIA to provide that any
judgment rendered under the act, or any arbitral award enforced under
the act, may be executed against any property of the foreign state that
"is used or intended to be used for a commercial activity in the United
States." This improvement would bring United States law into conformity
with recent continental practice and with legislation adopted subsequent
to the FSIA by the United Kingdom, Canada, and Australia.
In 1977, in the Philippine Embassy case, the Constitutional Court of
the Federal Republic of Germany recognized that there is no general rule
of international law that prohibits execution of judgment against the assets
of a foreign state. 4' Diplomatic and military property are immune from
execution, but state-owned property used for commercial activities is not
immune from execution if the court had jurisdiction to enter the judgment
executed upon.
The most recent legislation on foreign state immunity, the Australian
Foreign States Immunities Act of 1985, following the British example,
provides that state property "in use. . .substantially for commercial pur-
poses" is subject to execution. 42 Even the Soviet Union has recognized
this practice in trade agreements made with France, Germany, Japan and
several developing countries in the postwar period. 43
The United States has been slow to permit execution of judgment against
the assets of foreign states. Even after the government adopted the re-
38. 488 F. Supp. 665 and 502 F. Supp. 259 (D.D.C. 1980).
39. Letelire v. Lan Chile, 567 F. Supp. 1490 (S.D.N.Y. 1983).
40. 748 F.2d 790, 798 (2d Cir. 1984).
41. In re Republic of the Philippines, 46 B. Verf GE 342 (1977), 65 INT'l L. REP. 146
(1984).
42. Australian Foregin States Immunities Act, Sec. 32(i) & 3(a).
43. See Crawford, Execution of Judgments and Foreign Sovereign Immunity. 75 A.J.I.L.
820, 827-831 (1981).
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strictive theory of immunity in 1952, 44 and permitted prejudgment at-
tachment as a basis of jurisdiction, execution was not allowed. The FSIA
opened the door a crack, but its provisions are more restrictive than the
laws of many of our trading partners.
This reticence has been due mainly to exaggerated concerns at the
Department of Justice that changes in U.S. law may lead to execution of
judgment against the assets of our government overseas. Three comments
need to be made on this point. First, the principles embodied in H.R.
3137 have been accepted already by many other countries. This measure
will not increase the risk in those countries. Second, the exposure of the
United States government overseas is extremely limited. The immunity
of diplomatic and military property is well-established, and United States'
agencies have relatively few assets abroad that are used for commercial
activities.
Thirdly, the United States government has a strong interest in ensuring
effective legal remedies for Americans who conduct business with foreign
states. As the National Association of Manufacturers points out in its
letter to the chairman of February 14, 1986, 15 percent of world trade is
now carried out by state entities, many of which are based in the Free
World. President Reagan attaches great importance to the role of private
trade and investment in international economic development. The private
sector cannot fulfill that role without a secure legal environment for trade
and investment with foreign sovereigns. This bill will improve the rem-
edies available in the United States courts, and the ABA hopes the admin-
istration will support positive action by Congress.
Finally, the present law does not indicate clearly whether a claimant
may execute judgment against an embassy bank account, if that account
is used for commercial activities. In one case, execution has been per-
mitted against an embassy bank account. 45 This is a difficult problem. If
a foreign state is allowed to shelter commercial assets in a diplomatic
bank account, it will be able to frustrate the legitimate claims of judgment
creditors. Conversely, the attachment of an embassy bank account is likely
to interfere with the operation of the diplomatic mission and to cause
tensions in United States relations with the country concerned. H.R. 3137
addresses this problem by stipulating that a bank account used to maintain
a diplomatic or consular mission, or the residence of a chief of mission,
is not subject to execution "unless that bank account is also used for
commercial purposes unrelated to diplomatic or consular functions." This
44. See letter from Acting Legal Adviser Jack Tate to Acting Attorney General Philip B.
Perlman, 26 DEPT. STATE BULL. 984 (1952).
45. See Birch Shipping Corp. v. Embassy of the United Republic of Tanzania, 507 F.
Supp. 311 (D.D.C. 1980).
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limitation would apply even where the foreign state has waived its im-
munity from execution.
Thus, an embassy bank account would retain absolute immunity from
execution of judgment, and from prejudgment attachment, notwithstand-
ing the use of the account for commercial activities necessary for the
operation of the embassy, such as the purchase of supplies for the dip-
lomatic mission. To this extent the amendment would reverse the District
Court decision in Birch Shipping Co. v. Embassy of the United Republic
of Tanzania.46 However, the account would lose its immunity under the
FSIA, if the embassy allowed it to be used for business activities con-
ducted by the government or any of its agencies. That would be the case,
for instance, if the account was used to receive proceeds from the sale
of petroleum or other products in the United States.
This compromise is fair to all parties concerned. It protects the dip-
lomatic interests of the foreign state which has full control over the use
of the embassy bank account, and avoids abuse of the account for purposes
which are not within the proper functions of a diplomatic mission. 47 In
this particular instance, the act, as amended, would look to the purpose
of the activity, not to determine whether the activity is commercial, but
to determine whether admittedly commercial activity is related to the
diplomatic function.
The principle established in section 1603(d) of the act is not affected
by this amendment. The courts have jurisdiction under section 1605(a)(2)
of the act over any contract for the sale of goods or services, or any other
commercial activity, regardless of the purpose of the transaction. A con-
tract for the purchase of shoes for the army, for the repair of the embassy,
or for the export of natural resources regulated by the state is a commercial
transaction, jure gestionis.
H.R. 3137 makes some additional technical changes in the wording of
section 1610. In the existing law, commercial assets available for execution
are described as "property used for a commercial activity in the United
States" 48 and as property which "is or was used for" a particular com-
mercial activity. 49 The words used in the amendment are: "the property
is used or intended to be used for a commercial activity in the United
States."
Moneys in bank accounts which are used for commercial transactions
from time to time should be available for execution. The claimant is not
required to show that the foreign state has a specific intention with respect
46. 507 F. Supp. 311 (D.D.C. 1980).
47. But c'j Republic of Philippines, supra note 41, n. 35.
48. 28 U.S.C. § 1610(a) (1982).
49. 28 U.S.C. § 1610(a)(2) (1982).
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to the future use of the bank account at the time of execution of judgment
or of prejudgment attachment. Further, this change is not intended to
deprive the courts of their inherent power to look through transfers that
are intended to avoid the processes of the courts. The courts retain that
power as described in the Report of the Judiciary Committee on the
FSIA. 50 Under the amendment, section 1610(b) of the FSIA appears in
simplified form as section 1610(a)(3). The only substantive change is to
include a judgment under section 1605(a)(4), if there be any.
The amendment also deletes the reference to insurance policies in sec-
tion 1605(a)(5) of the act for two reasons. First, the amendment provides
a much broader remedy for execution of noncommercial tort judgments
that would include the interests described in the present language. Second,
section 7(a) of the Diplomatic Relations Act of 1978 provides a direct
right of action against the insurer in cases involving liability for personal
injury, death or damage to property.51
Finally, this amendment will bring to the fore an issue which is not fully
clarified by the FSIA. Under what circumstances can a government agency
with juridical identity separate from the foreign state be held responsible
for the actions of the state and vice versa? This question arises with
respect to both jurisdiction and execution. Although the definition of
"foreign state" in section 1603(a) of the act includes autonomous agencies
of the state, the structure of the act and its legislative history make clear
that one autonomous agency of the state is not responsible for claims
against another autonomous agency of that state. 52 However, the legis-
lative history is also clear that the FSIA does not address the question
when the state is responsible for the actions of its agencies or when the
property of an agency may be executed upon to satisfy a claim against
the state. The draftsmen regarded this as a question of substantive law
beyond the scope of the FSIA. 53
The Supreme Court addressed the issue in First National City Bank v.
Banco Para El Commercio Exterior de Cuba,54 (Bancec), where the de-
fendant, Citibank, asserted as a counterclaim against the Cuban agency,
its claim against the state for the expropriation of its branches in Cuba.
The Court held that normally the separate personality of agencies estab-
lished as distinct and independent entities will be respected. However,
equitable principles permit a court to disregard the separate identities of
50. H.R. REP., supra note 2, at 6627.
51. Diplomatic Relations Act, Pub. L. No. 95-393, 92 Stat.
808 (1978) (codified as amended at 28 U.S.C. § 1364 (West Supp. 1986)).
52. H.R. REP., supra note 2, at 6628.
53. Id. at 6610.
54. 462 U.S. 611, 629-30 (1983).
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a sovereign and its instrumentalities where the agency "is so extensively
controlled by its owner that a relationship of principal and agent is cre-
ated," where adherence to the corporate form would "work fraud or
injustice" or where the separate form is used to defeat legislative policies. 55
If the ABA amendments are adopted, this question will arise more often,
because execution will not be limited to commercial property related to
the activity upon which the claim is based. Presumably, the courts would
rely on the principles stated in the Bancec case to resolve these issues on
a case-by-case basis.
E. PREJUDGMENT ATTACHMENT
The problems of execution of judgment under the FSIA are com-
pounded by the statute's restrictions on prejudgment attachment. Section
1610(d) of the act excludes prejudgment attachment, even for the purpose
of securing satisfaction of a judgment, unless "the foreign state has ex-
plicitly waived its immunity from attachment prior to judgment." 56 Im-
plicit waivers of immunity, which are permitted with respect tojurisdiction
and execution, are not recognized as regards prejudgment attachment.
Further, a court of appeals has held that an injunction may not be issued
where attachment is prohibited by the FSIA. 57 Although the Act makes
no mention of injunctions, the court concluded it would frustrate the intent
of Congress if a restraint prohibited by one means could be achieved by
another.
The result is that a claimant has no means of preventing a defendant
from removing its property from the United States after a lawsuit is ini-
tiated and before judgment is rendered. This limitation is particularly
serious where the action is brought against an agency or instrumentality
of the foreign state that is engaged in commercial activity in the United
States. In that situation, the Act permits execution against any property
of the agency of ajudgment based on commercial activity, expropriation,
noncommercial tort or certain maritime proceedings. 58 This broad ex-
posure provides an incentive for the foreign state to remove the property
of the defendant agency from the jurisdiction. The lack of any means of
preventing such action may negate the remedy the FSIA was intended to
provide.
The reason for this restriction lies in the history of sovereign immunity
in the United States. From 1952 to 1976, the United States permitted
55. See also, Kalamazoo Spice Extraction Company v. The Provisional Military Gov-
ernment of Socialist Ethiopia, 616 F.Supp. 660 (W.D. Mich. 1985).
56. 28 U.S.C. § 1610(d) (1982).
57. S&S Machinery Co. v. Masinexport-import, 706 F.2d 411 (2d Cir. 1983).
58. 28 U.S.C. 1610(b).
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attachment of the property of foreign states as a means of establishing
jurisdiction quasi in rem over sovereign parties that could not be served
in the United States. During this period, vessels, aircraft and bank ac-
counts of foreign states frequently were attached, and these attachments
often led to problems with the foreign states concerned.
One of the objectives of the act was to eliminate these tensions, and
to facilitate the exercise of jurisdiction by the courts in appropriate cases,
by establishing jurisdiction on the basis of specified contacts with the
United States and permitting service of notice on the foreign state through
diplomatic channels, if necessary. With such a "long-arm" statute in
place, attachments would no longer be necessary to obtain jurisdiction
over a sovereign party, and attachment for that purpose was prohibited
by the act.
The draftsmen may have gone too far, however, in excluding attach-
ments for the purpose of securing a judgment. This shortcoming in the
statutory scheme became painfully evident when the revolution in Iran
threatened the interests of hundreds of American investors, contractors
and lenders. Faced with statutory language which, if applied strictly, made
the courts helpless to assist American claimants, many judges found a
way around the Act by decisions that appear inconsistent with the case
law which developed subsequently. That temptation could recur in other
situations where the equities are strong.
In these circumstances, the ABA has concluded it would serve the
interests of all parties concerned to establish more realistic rules that
would permit the courts to protect the interests of claimants, where the
facts require provisional measures of relief, under uniform safeguards that
will prevent harassment of sovereign parties that are brought before our
courts. Accordingly, section 4 of H.R. 3137 would amend section 1610(d)
of the FSIA to permit, in certain defined circumstances, prejudgment
attachment or injunction to secure execution of a judgment or arbitral
award against the property of an agency or instrumentality of a foreign
state that is engaged in commercial activity in the United States.
No provisional measures would be authorized by this amendment against
the property of the state itself, and the restrictions established elsewhere
in the act on attachment or execution against diplomatic, military or cen-
tral bank assets would remain undisturbed. Further, prejudgment attach-
ment would be permitted under this provision only where the property
in question would be subject to execution on ajudgment in that case under
the FSIA and where the property of a private party would be subject to
attachment or injunction in like circumstances.
Further, the party seeking the attachment or injunction would have to
show both "a probability of success on the merits" and "a probability
that the assets will be removed from the United States." The moving
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party also would be required to post a bond of at least 50 percent of the
value of the property attached. These are serious limitations that will
discourage attachment for purposes of harassment and allow the courts
to act where the interests of justice require provisional rememdies.
Ill. Conclusion
In conclusion, the amendments to the FSIA proposed in H.R. 3137 and
H.R. 4592, if enacted, would significantly improve the operation of the
act without affecting its structure or basic principles. These are perfecting
amendments which the ABA hopes Congress will adopt without further
delay. There are a number of other problems relating to sovereign im-
munity and act of state that may require congressional action in the future
and the ABA will cooperate in any further work on these issues that may
be required.
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